Abstract. Known practical blind signature schemes whose security against adaptive and parallel attacks can be proven in the random oracle model either need five data exchanges between the signer and the user or are limited to issue only logarithmically many signatures in terms of a security parameter. This paper presents an efficient blind signature scheme that allows a polynomial number of signatures to be securely issued while only three data exchanges are needed. Its security is proven in the random oracle model. As an application, a provably secure solution for double-spender-traceable e-cash is presented.
Introduction
Blind signatures are a key part of some information systems that offer both user privacy and data authenticity. Such systems include anonymous electronic cash and electronic voting as typical examples. The notion of blind signatures was first introduced by Chaum in [12] with the first scheme based on RSA. Later, some discrete-log based signature schemes were turned into blind signatures [24, 10, 21] . For some applications, extra functionalities, such as partial blindness [2, 1, 3] and revocability [6, 11, 9] , were added. A secure blind signature scheme should be one-more unforgeable against adaptive and parallel attacks. Namely, users should not be able to produce more signatures than legitimately issued.
There are some theoretical results on the security of blind signatures [14, 25, 22] . In [22] , a formal security definition and a secure scheme were introduced, though the scheme was rather impractical compared to ordinary signature schemes in real use. In [27, 29] , Pointcheval and Stern proved that one type of efficient blind signature schemes, which includes Okamoto-Schnorr [23] and Okamoto-Guillou-Quisquater [20] signatures, to be secure in the random oracle model [4] as long as a logarithmic number of signatures were issued. Later, [26] introduced a generic adaptation that renders logarithmically secure blind signature schemes into secure ones with polynomially many signatures. Its cost is two additional data transfers. As the underlying schemes require three data transfers, the resulting schemes need five moves of data between the signer and a user. In [30] , Schnorr and Jakobsson argued the security of the Schnorr blind signature in the random oracle model with a strong assumption; the attacker is generic, i.e., restricted to use the group operation only. In [17] , Fischlin pointed out some pitfalls that could be found between the generic adversary plus random oracle model and the reality. This paper presents a blind signature scheme that needs only three data moves and provides polynomial security, i.e., one-more unforgeable even if polynomially many signatures are issued in an adaptive and concurrent manner. The security is proven in the random oracle model. The scheme remains practical as it requires only three to four times more computation than the original Schnorr signatures [31] .
Another advantage of our scheme is its potential support of protocols that need additional functionality. By following the idea of [3] , one can easily extend our scheme to be partially blind schemes. Furthermore, it is shown that a variant of our scheme gives a provably secure solution for double-spender-traceable electronic cash systems. Note that such e-cash schemes in the literature, e.g. [6, 7, 18] , rely on a variant of blind signatures called restrictive blind signatures [7] , whose security has been proved only under non-standard and strong assumptions and only against certain restricted attacks [8] while our solution withstands the most general attacks.
Security Definitions
Blind signature schemes have two aspects of security; blindness and one-more unforgeability. Let (G, S, U, V) be a blind signature scheme where G is the key generation algorithm, S and U are a signer and a user, respectively, and V is a verification algorithm (refer to [22] for a formal definition of blind signature schemes).
Definition 1. (Blindness) Let S
* and D * be a signer and a distinguisher. Let view 0 and view 1 be views of S * during executions of the signature issuing protocol where honest user U obtains valid signature-message pairs (Σ 0 , msg 0 ) and
* outputs b ∈ {0, 1}. A signature scheme is blind if, for all polynomial-time S * and D * , b = b happens with probability at most 1/2 + 1/n c for sufficiently large n and some constant c. The probability is taken over the coin flips of G, S * , D * and U.
Note that our scheme provides computational blindness defined as above while some of the previously known schemes achieve perfect blindness where the success probability of unbound D * is exactly 1/2.
Definition 2. (One-more unforgeability) A blind signature scheme is ( , + 1) unforgeable if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm U * , U * outputs + 1 valid signatures with probability at most 1/n c for sufficiently large n and some constant c after interacting with legitimate signer S at most times in an adaptive and concurrent manner. The probability is taken over the coin flips of G, S, and U * .
In the random oracle model, these success probabilities also depend on the choice of random oracles.
3 The Proposed Scheme
Underlying Idea
The proposed scheme is based on the partially blind signature scheme of [3] . Roughly, their scheme is a witness indistinguishable variant of the Schnorr signature scheme where the signer uses two public keys y(= g x ) and z(= g w ), which we call the real public key and the tag public key, respectively, in such a way that the signature can be issued only with real secret key x but no one can distinguish which secret key, i.e., x or w, was used. Their scheme then allows the signer to sign with several different tag public keys to achieve partial blindness. It was proven that the same tag key could be used only for logarithmically many signatures but the signer could use polynomially many tag keys. Accordingly, if the signer generates a one-time tag key each time he signs, it achieves polynomial security, though the blindness is lost.
Our scheme follows the above approach with additional ideas to retain blindness. It allows the user to blind the tag public key so that the resulting signature can be verified with the real public key provided by the signer and the blinded tag public key provided by the user. However, if the blinding is perfectly done and the resulting tag public key just looks like a random public key, the user could himself generate such a signature by arbitrarily creating the tag key and exploiting witness indistinguishability. Accordingly, we restrict the blinding so that the resulting blinded tag key maintains a link to the original one but the link is computationally hidden. Namely, our scheme provides computational blindness. The main idea to realize this property is to use a pair of tag public-keys, say (z, z 1 ), in such a way that z is fixed and z 1 is changed for every signature. The user blinds them into (ζ, ζ 1 ) = (z γ , z γ 1 ) with random factor γ so that log z z 1 = log ζ ζ 1 holds. Accordingly, (ζ, ζ 1 ) preserves the relation that underlies (z, z 1 ). The blindness is now provided if the signer cannot decide whether (z, z 1 , ζ, ζ 1 ) is in such relation or not. Some more tricks are added to force the user follow the blinding procedure to get valid signatures.
This restrictive blinding stealthily preserves the link between each valid signature to a particular execution of the issuing protocol. Thus, if + 1 signatures are generated after executions of the signing protocol, there exists an execution that yields at least two signatures. Accordingly, we only need to consider the possibility of yielding two signatures from one issuing, which results in more efficient reduction than the previous results.
Construction
Let G be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes security parameter n and outputs (p, q, g) where p, q are large primes that satisfy q|p − 1, and g is an element of Z Z * p whose order is q. By g , we denote a prime subgroup in Z Z * p generated by g. Let H 1 : {0, 1} * → g , H 2 : {0, 1} * → g , and H 3 : {0, 1} * → Z Z q be hash functions. We assume that it is hard to compute the discrete log of
Signer User the outputs of H 1 and H 2 . Such hash functions may be constructed in practice as SHA(str) (p−1)/q mod p allowing negligibly small error probability [3] .
[Key Generation] The signer executes (p, q, g) ← G(1 n ), and selects h ∈ U g , x ∈ U Z Z q . It then computes real public-key y and fixed tag key z as y = g x mod p and z = H 1 (p q g h y), respectively. If z = 1, abandon the key and retry. The public key is (p, q, g, h, y, z), and the private key is x.
[Signature Issuing] Here we overview the signature issuing protocol at a higher level. The details are illustrated in Figure 1 . Hereafter, all arithmetic operations are done in Z Z p unless otherwise noted.
Signer S: S generates a random string rnd and a one-time tag key z 1 = H 2 (rnd). Sending rnd convinces U that log g z 1 is not known to S. Then z 2 is computed so that z = z 1 · z 2 holds. The rest of the issuing protocol consists of two parts:
-y-side: Proof of knowledge x of y = g x , and -z-side: Proof of knowledge (w 1 , w 2 ) of z 1 = g w1 , z 2 = h w2 .
Since z-side witness is not known to S, the z-side proof is done by simulation as illustrated in Figure 1 by using the OR-proof technique of [13] . Accordingly, S can complete the protocol only with y-side witness x.
User U: U blinds and converts the y-side proof into a signature in the same way as done in Schnorr blind signatures [24, 10] . For z-side, U blinds z, z 1 , z 2 into ζ, ζ 1 , ζ 2 by raising them with random factor γ. The proofs for z 1 , z 2 given from S are also blinded, and then converted into signatures in the standard way with adjustment for the effect of γ. U then creates an additional Schnorr signature that proves ζ = z γ . The resulting signature Σ is 8-tuple Σ = (ζ, ζ 1 , ρ, , σ 1 , σ 2 , δ, µ) that proves the knowledge of log g y ∨ (log g ζ 1 ∧ log h (ζ/ζ 1 ) ∧ log z ζ).
[Signature Verification] A signature message pair (Σ, m) is valid if it satisfies ζ ≡ 1 and
4 Security Proofs Proof. Observe that the following holds.
Furthermore, ζ ≡ 1 holds as γ = 0 when the user is honest.
Blindness
Theorem 2. The proposed scheme is blind if the decision Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable and H 1 , H 2 , H 3 are random oracles.
Proof. (sketch) Suppose that (S * , D * ) is successful in breaking blindness with probability 1/2 + where is not negligible. Let t s be the maximum running time of D * , which is also polynomially bound. We show that S * can be used to solve the DDH problem. Define
4 be a DDH instance, which is taken from DH or R with equal probability. Given such an instance, first define H 1 so that z = A. Select b ∈ U {0, 1} and engage in the issuing protocol with S * twice. Label the executions run 0 and run 1 . Define H 2 so that z 1 = B in run b , and z 1 ∈ U g in run 1−b . Follow the protocol in both run. Then, generate a signature-message pair (Σ, m) that includes (ζ, ζ 1 ) = (C, D). Other variables in Σ are generated by using the standard zero knowledge simulation technique; randomly choose ρ, , σ 1 , σ 2 , δ, µ, and then define H 3 so that it looks consistent. Given (Σ, m) and views from S, distinguisher D * outputs b . If b = b, we conclude that the instance is in DH. It is in R, otherwise.
Observe that if (A, B, C, D) ∈ DH, Σ is a valid signature that can be produced in run b , since log z z 1 = log A B = log C D = log ζ ζ 1 and there exist blinding factors t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 , t 5 that convert the view of run b into Σ 1 . On the other hand, Σ cannot be produced from run 1−b since log z z 1 = log ζ ζ 1 except for negligible probability. Therefore, given Σ, D * outputs correct b with probability 1/2 + . Next, observe that if (A, B, C, D) ∈ R, Σ cannot be produced in either run 0 and run 1 since log z z 1 = log ζ ζ 1 for both runs except for negligible probability. Hence, b is independent of Σ, and b = b happens with probability 1/2. Thus, the success probability in DDH problem is 1/2(1/2 + ) + 1/2(1/2) = 1/2 + /2, which contradicts to the DDH assumption when is not negligible. Note that D * may not terminate in time t s if the instance is in R. However, this is also to our advantage since we can see that Σ is not a proper input to D * and the instance is in R.
Finally, note that if S * chooses the same rnd in both executions, the resulting signatures are perfectly indistinguishable as there exist consistent blinding factors for any combination of the views and signatures.
Note that the blindness relies on the decision Diffie-Hellman assumption over the public key of the signer. This suggests that an adversarial signer could choose p, q, g so that the DDH problem could be solved with those parameters. However, as we shall show in the next section, one-more unforgeability is based on the discrete logarithm assumption. Therefore, choosing weak parameters to violate blindness could result in the loss of one-more unforgeability unless DL is strictly harder than DDH. Nevertheless, it is beneficial for the users to verify that the public keys are generated and the hash functions are chosen so that those assumptions are likely to hold. There are several practical solutions for this matter. An inexpensive solution would be to use a widely believed secure 1 This is why b1, b2
? ∈ g has to be checked. Without this check, wrong b1, b2 could produce a valid signature if γ is a lucky choice. This results in a nonuniform distribution of γ while the one that underlies the simulated signature follows the uniform distribution.
hash function like SHA-1, and plug it into the source of randomness of G so that the users can believe that there is no room for the adversarial signer to control the resulting parameters. It is also needed to check if y is in g and z is correctly made. In practice these could be examined by a certificate authority at registration on behalf of the users.
One
The proof is structured as follows. We first observe that the scheme is witness indistinguishable [15] (Lemma 1), which helps us to simulate the signer with either y-side or z-side witness(es) to extract the witness of the other side. It is then proven that the user can blind (z, z 1 ) into (ζ, ζ 1 ) only in such a way that log z ζ = log z1 ζ 1 to obtain a valid signature (Lemma 2). We then show that creating a valid signature without engaging in the issuing protocol with the legitimate signer is infeasible (Lemma 3). From Lemma 2 and 3, one can see that if the user engages in the signature issuing protocol times and outputs + 1 signatures, there exist at least two valid signatures linked to a particular run of the issuing protocol. So the rest is to prove that such a forger who is successful in producing two signatures from a single protocol run can be used to solve the discrete logarithm problem. Lemma 1. The signature issuing protocol is witness indistinguishable.
The above lemma holds immediately according to [13] . Indeed, it is not hard to see that the issuing protocol can be completed if the signer knows either y-side witness x, or z-side witness (w 1 , w 2 ) = (log g z 1 , log h z 2 ).
Hereafter, let run i denote the label of i-th execution of the issuing protocol. We define z-side witness in run i as (w 1i , w 2i ).
Lemma 2. (Restrictive Blinding) Let U * 0 be a user that engages in the signature issuing protocol times, and outputs a valid message-signature pair, (m, ζ, ζ 1 , ρ, , σ 1 , σ 2 , δ, µ). Let z 1i denote z 1 used by S in run i . For polynomially bound and for all polynomial-time U * 0 , the probability that log z ζ = log z1i ζ 1 holds for all i is negligible if the discrete logarithm problem is intractable and H 1 , H 2 , H 3 are random oracles.
Proof idea: Suppose that log g h is not known. We assign z = g w1 h w2 and (z 1J , z 2J ) = (g w1 , h w2 ) for J ∈ U {1, . . . , } by defining H 1 and H 2 so. Since the signature contains proofs of ζ = z γ , ζ 1 = g w 1 , ζ 2 = h w 2 , we may be capable of extracting (γ, w 1 , w 2 ) by rewinding the user in the random oracle model. Once it is done, the condition log z ζ = log z1J ζ 1 guarantees that we obtain two different representations of z, i.e., z = g w1 h w2 = g w 1 /γ h w 2 /γ , which allows us to compute log g h. For this to be done, we need to simulate S that issues signatures
(After) Fig. 2 . The interaction among signer S, adversary U * 1 , and random oracle H3.
without knowing log g h. We do this with y-side witness x by exploiting witness indistinguishability. The problem is that, due to witness indistinguishability, the rewinding may result in extracting y-side witness x, which is already known. So we first flip a coin to decide with which witness, y-side or z-side, the simulation is performed, and expect that one of the following happens.
-Simulation is done with y-side witness (and z-side witness in run J ). Then another z-side witness is extracted by rewinding. This solves log g h. -Simulation is done with z-side witnesses. Then y-side witness is extracted by rewinding. This solves log g y.
Proof. Assume that, having at most q h accesses to H 3 and asking at most signatures to S, U * 0 outputs signature (ζ, ζ 1 , ρ, , σ 1 , σ 2 , δ, µ) that satisfies log z ζ 1 = log z1i ζ 1 for all i with probability 0 which is not negligible in n. Here, q h and are bound by a polynomial of security parameter n. We randomly fix an index Q ∈ {1, . . . , q h } and regard U * 0 as successful only if the resulting signature corresponds to the Q-th query to H 3 . (If it does not correspond to any query, U * 0 is successful only with negligible probability due to the randomness of H 3 .) Accordingly, it is equivalent to assuming an adversary, say U * 1 , that asks H 3 only once and succeeds with probability 1 ≥ 0 /q h . Figure 2 illustrates the interaction among the signer S, adversarial user U * 1 , and random oracle H 3 . Given U * 1 , we construct machine M 1 that solves the discrete-log problem by simulating the interaction. Let (p, q, g, Y) be an instance to solve log g Y in Z Z q .
Reduction Algorithm: M 1 first sets (p, q, g) := (p, q, g). It then flips a coin χ ∈ U {0, 1} to select either y := Y (case χ = 0) , or h := Y (case χ = 1).
Case y = Y: (Extracting y-side witness)
1. M 1 selects w, w 0 ∈ U Z Z q and sets h := g w and z := H 1 (p q g y) = g w0 . 2. M 1 runs U * 1 simulating S with z-side witnesses as follows. (a) Select c i , r i ∈ U Z Z q and compute a i := g ri y ci . (b) Select rnd i ∈ U {0, 1} * and w 1i ∈ U Z Z q and define H 2 (rnd i ) as g w1i . Then compute w 2i := (w 0 − w 1i )/w mod q. (Accordingly, z 1i = g w1i and Case h = Y: (Extracting z-side witness)
1. M 1 selects x ∈ U Z Z q and sets y := g x . It also selects w 1 , w 2 ∈ U Z Z q and sets z := H 1 (p q g y) = g w1 h w2 . 2. M 1 selects I ∈ U {0, . . . , } and J ∈ U {1, . . . , }. signature, say (ζ, ζ 1 , ρ, , σ 1 , σ 2 , δ, µ) , that corresponds to ε. 5. Rewind and restart U * 1 with the same setting.
-If I = 0, M 1 simulates H 3 by returning ε ∈ U Z Z q . Otherwise, set ε = ε.
-If I = 0 and run J has not yet been completed before the query to H 3 is sent, M 1 simulates the execution by using both y-side and z-side witnesses as above choosing d J ∈ U Z Z q . Otherwise, M 1 simulates only with y-side witness choosing d J = d J . 6. U * 1 outputs a signature, say (ζ, ζ 1 , ρ , , σ 1 , σ 2 , δ , µ ), that corresponds to ε . 7. If δ = δ , M 1 computes w 1 = (σ 1 − σ 1 )/(µ − µ ) mod q, w 2 = (σ 2 − σ 2 )/(µ − µ ) mod q, and outputs w = (w 1 − w 1 )/(w 2 − w 2 ) mod q. Simulation fails, otherwise.
Evaluation of success probability:
In Figure 2 , observe that independent variables given to U * 1 are p, q, g, h, y,
i for all i, and ε and the random tape of U * 1 . All other variables are uniquely determined by these independent variables. Note that e i 's are also determined by the random tape of U * 1 and the variables that appeared so far. We wrap all these independent variables into Λ, except for {ε,
Let S be the set of all (Λ, D ε ) that leads U * 1 to a success, i.e., Pr Λ,Dε [(Λ, D ε ) ∈ S] ≥ 1 . According to Lemma 4 , with probability at least 1 /2, randomly selected
We consider how sensitive δ is to D ε . Define function ψ as
Let δ max be the value of δ that maximizes ψ(δ). That is, δ max is the value of δ that is most likely to appear in a successful output of U * . Let ψ max = ψ(δ max ). We consider two cases.
Case 1 (ψ max is not negligible) : In this case, δ is not likely to change even if D ε changes, so we perform the rewinding simulation with z-side witnesses choosing D ε and D ε uniformly. By the definition of ψ max , uniformly chosen D ε and D ε yield δ max with probability greater than ψ 2 max , which is not negligible. Since ε differs in D ε and D ε with overwhelming probability, we have + δ max = ε = ε = + δ max (mod q). Thus, we obtain = with which y-side witness can be extracted as written in Step-6 of Case y = Y. 
with probability < ψ max . We can correctly guess such index J with probability at least 1/( + 1) by randomly taking it from {0, . . . , }. Taking the complement of the above, we see that randomly chosen D
with probability ≥ 1 − ψ max . Now suppose that D ε is made from D ε by choosing d J ∈ U Z Z q , and δ is produced as δ ← D ε . From the above observation, {δ = δ} ∨ {(Λ, D ε ) ∈ S} happens with probability not negligible in n. According to Lemma 4, with probability 1 /4, uniformly chosen D
Thus, with probability not negligible in n, such D ε and D ε are in S and result in δ = δ. From this collision, z-side witness log g h can be extracted as shown in
Step-7 of Case h = Y. The simulation with such D ε and D ε can be done if the simulator has y-side witness and z-side witness of run J since they differ at only one index J.
The probability distribution over these cases depends on Λ and the strategy of U * 1 . Note that the distribution of Λ does not depend on the choice of χ as the protocol is witness indistinguishable and the public key are generated so that it distributes uniformly. Accordingly, the coin flip of χ turns the simulation to the proper case with probability 1/2. Lemma 3. Any poly-time adversary U * 3 outputs a valid signature without interacting with S only with negligible probability if the discrete logarithm problem is intractable and H 1 , H 2 , H 3 are random oracles.
Proof. (sketch) This is equivalent to proving the security of the ordinary (i.e., non-blind) version of the signature scheme against key-only attack [19] . Thus it can be done by the rewinding simulation in the random oracle model in a similar way as done in [28] . Given Y ∈ U g , we construct a machine, M 2 , that finds log g Y in Z Z q . M 2 first selects w, ξ randomly and sets y = Y, h = g w , z = Yg ξ . (Since M 2 does not need to simulate signer S, it can put Y into both y and z.) M 2 then invokes U * 3 twice with the same initial settings and different ε and ε as answers of H 3 . Let the resulting signatures be (ζ, ζ 1 , ρ, , σ 1 , σ 2 , δ, µ) and
and log g Y = log g z − ξ = (w 1 + w 2 /w)/γ − ξ mod q.
Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that there exists an adversary U * 4 that outputs + 1 valid signatures with probability 4 not negligible in n after interacting with S at most times. The case of = 0 has been proven by Lemma 3. We consider ≥ 1.
Due to Lemma 2 and 3, among the + 1 signatures, there exist at least two signature-message pairs which contains (ζ, ζ 1 ) and (ζ,ζ 1 ) such that log ζ ζ 1 = logζζ 1 = log z z 1I holds for z 1I used in run I for some I in {1, . . . , }. Now, there exist two queries to H 3 that correspond to those signatures. In a similar way as used in the proof of Lemma 2, we guess the indexes of these queries and regard U * 4 as being successful only if the guess is correct. Accordingly, this is equivalent to an adversary, say U * 5 , that asks H 3 only twice and succeeds with probability 5 = 4 / q h 2 in producing two signatures in the expected relation. We construct a machine M 3 that, given (p, q, g, Y), solves log g Y in Z Z q by using U *
.
Reduction algorithm: M 3 sets (p, q, g) := (p, q, g). It then flips a coin, χ ∈ U {0, 1}, to select either y := Y (case χ = 0) , or y := g x with randomly chosen x (case χ = 1) .
1. M 3 selects w, w 0 ∈ U Z Z q and sets h := g w and z := g w0 by defining H 1 so. 2. M 3 selects I ∈ U {1, . . . , } and J ∈ U {1, 2}. 
Evaluation of success probability: (sketch) The probability that U * 5 is successful and the obtained twin signatures are correlated to run I is at least 5 / . The probability is taken over the coin flips of G, S, U is now taken over the choice of H 3 , i.e., ε 1 and ε 2 . We show that the standard rewinding simulation works to extract the witness of the desired side with probability not negligible in the security parameter. (The rest of the proof is actually the same as that in [3] , so we give only a brief sketch below.) By ε, we denote (ε 1 , ε 2 ) hereafter. Note that the number of all possible ε is q 2 . Define Succ as a set of ε with which U * 5 succeeds. Then, there exists a many-to-one mapping from ε ∈ Succ to e I , which is the challenge from U * 5 used in run I . Since 5 /2 is not negligible in n, #Succ > q holds for infinitely many values of n. Thus, there exist ε and ε in Succ that result in the same e I . Let tr i denote a transcript obtained in run i . That is, tr i = { (rnd i , a i , b 1i , b 2i ), e i , d i } (excluding dependent variables, r i , w i , s 1i , s 2i ). For such ε and ε , the sequences of the transcriptions are identical with regard to run I , that is, (tr 1 , · · · , tr I , · · · , tr ) and (tr 1 , · · · , tr I , · · · , tr ).
Since the issuing protocol is witness indistinguishable, the distribution of tr I does not depend on the choice of χ. The same is true for other tr i and tr i as they are produced by z-side witnesses selected independently from χ. Thus, if U * 5 is run twice with such ε and ε , U * 5 produces a collision that results in exposing either z-side witness or y-side witness independently from χ. It is successful if y-side witness is extracted when χ = 0, or z-side witness, which contains w 1 = log g z 1 = log g Y, is extracted when χ = 1. These successful cases happen with probability 1/2 due to the random choice of χ. The difficulty is that we rarely find such ε and ε . So we consider what happens if ε and ε that result in different e I and e I are chosen in the simulation. In this case, tr I and tr I differ and may reflect the choice of χ so that they only yield a useless witness that we already have. We can, however, prove that such useless result cannot occur all the time. Suppose that χ = 0 and ε and ε yield y-side witness as desired, but ε and ε only yield useless z-side witness. This means that = and = . Thus, = and desired y-side witness can be extracted if ε and ε are chosen. Following this observation, [3] estimated the probability of finding such a convenient pair of ε and concluded that it was not negligible in the security parameter n.
Application to Double-spender-traceable E-cash
Here we apply the proposed blind signature scheme to create a secure anonymous e-cash scheme that provides double-spender traceability.
The withdrawal protocol is exactly the same as the signature issuing protocol. A coin is 7-tuple coin = (ζ, ζ 1 , ρ, , σ 1 , σ 2 , δ), which omits µ from the signature described in the previous section. The user stores the coin together with τ and γ. To pay, the user releases the coin and (ε p , µ p ) where ε p = H 4 (z τ coin desc) and µ p = τ − ε p γ mod q. Here H 4 is a hash function H 4 : {0, 1} * → Z Z q and desc is the unique description of the transaction. The shop accepts if ζ ≡ 1, + δ ≡ H 3 (ζ ζ 1 g ρ y g σ1 ζ 1 δ h σ2 (ζ/ζ 1 ) δ z µp ζ εp ) mod q, and ε p ≡ H 4 (z µp ζ εp coin desc) mod q.
It is not hard to see that a double payment using different desc and desc with the same coin yields (ε p , µ p ) and (ε p , µ p ) which allows the bank to extract blinding factor γ as γ = (µ p − µ p )/(ε p − ε p ) mod p. Since we can prove that Lemma 2 also applies to this variant, ζ 1/γ should expose z 1 used in a particular withdrawal session invoked by an authenticated user.
Conclusion
We presented an efficient three-move blind signature scheme. It provides onemore unforgeability with polynomially many signatures. From a practical point of view, the scheme is less efficient than known logarithmically-secure schemes but remains practical as it costs only a few times more than the Schnorr blind signature scheme.
The unforgeability was proven under the discrete-log assumption in the random oracle model. Computing the exact reduction cost in the style of [5] seems hard due to the intricate reduction algorithm. Accordingly, the success probability was argued in a classical style, i.e., it was shown that the success probability of the reduction is not negligible with regard to the security parameter.
We also have presented a secure double-spender-traceable e-cash scheme to demonstrate the suitability of our scheme. The scheme is the first single-term scheme whose security against parallel withdrawals can be proven only under the discrete-log and the random oracle assumption.
